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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3722 
_____________ 
  
RADUL RADOVICH; SILVER MOUNTAIN PROMOTIONS, INC; 
 ST.  PETKA TRUST; R AND R HOLDINGS,                                                                               
      Appellants 
 
 v. 
  
L.P.  YA GLOBAL INVESTMENTS, L.P., a Delaware limited Partnership, 
 f/k/a Cornell Capital Partners, L.P.; YORKVILLE ADVISORS, LLC, 
 A Delaware limited liability company; YORKVILLE ADVISORS GP, LLC;  
MARK ANGELO; DAVID GONZALEZ; CRAIG ENGLER  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 2:12-cv-06723) 
District Judge:  Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 22, 2014 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 20, 2014) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Radul Radovich and several entities he controls appeal the District Court’s 
dismissal of his complaint on res judicata grounds.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts 
relevant to our disposition.  Radovich and entities he controls1 owned a substantial 
amount of shares in a pharmaceutical corporation called Cobalis.  Radovich was also the 
chairman of its board.  Cobalis’s shares were publicly traded on domestic over-the-
counter markets.  Cobalis needed money to help finance its operations and product 
development.  It reached out to YA Global Investments, L.P. (“YAGI”), formerly known 
as Cornell Capital Partners, L.P., a hedge fund that specialized in making private 
investments in public equity (“PIPE transactions”).2  Radovich’s son, Chaslav Radovich, 
who was Cobalis’s president, began negotiating on behalf of Cobalis and Radovich, and 
according to the complaint “was at all times acting as agent for the Plaintiffs.”  Appendix 
(“App.”) 363. 
                                              
1 The entities he controls are plaintiffs in this action:  Silver Mountain Promotions, Inc., 
St. Petka Trust, and R and R Holdings.  Because Radovich owns and controls all of these 
entities, this opinion will sometimes refer to the plaintiffs simply as “Radovich.” 
2 All of the other defendants were associated with YAGI and are defending this action 
collectively.  Yorkville Advisors G.P, L.L.C. was its general partner; Yorkville Advisors, 
L.L.C. was a “financial advisor for the financing clients of YAGI” (App. 361); Mark 
Angelo was the founder, president and majority owner of YAGI and the Yorkville 
entities; and David Gonzalez and Craig Engler were employees of YAGI. 
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 Chaslav Radovich and YAGI agreed to terms and entered into a “structured” PIPE 
transaction on December 20, 2006.  YAGI agreed to lend $3.85 million to Cobalis in the 
form of debentures that could convert to shares if certain conditions came to pass.  
YAGI’s loan was convertible into common shares at a conversion price that 
automatically adjusted downward should Cobalis’s share price fall.  As collateral for the 
loan, Radovich agreed to place 8.4 million of his Cobalis shares in an escrow account 
with defendant David Gonzalez as the escrow agent.  These shares were secured by a 
Pledge and Escrow Agreement, which allowed for the transfer of these shares to YAGI if 
Cobalis suffered an “event of default.”  App. 81-83.  The Pledge and Escrow Agreement 
was signed by Radovich, Mark Angelo on behalf of YAGI, Chaslav Radovich on behalf 
of Cobalis, and David Gonzalez as the escrow agent.  
 Radovich claims that the structure of the PIPE transaction concerned him because 
it gave YAGI a “strong incentive” to sell shares of Cobalis short, thereby driving down 
their market price, reducing the price at which YAGI could convert its loan into shares, 
and ultimately leaving it with more shares.  App. 363.  To assuage his concerns, he 
contends that YAGI made numerous assurances — mostly oral, but at least one written 
— that YAGI would not “engage in transactions that would have the effect or potential to 
depress the price of Cobalis stock.”  App. 366.  Despite these assurances, Radovich 
claims that YAGI shorted Cobalis stock, thereby driving down its price and preventing 
Cobalis from raising additional money through share sales.   
 At some point between April and July 2007, YAGI also became aware that a third 
party obtained a judgment against Cobalis in an unrelated matter and attempted to 
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enforce it against Cobalis.  YAGI allegedly considered this an event of default and 
Radovich’s shares were “wrongfully released” from escrow.  App. 374.   
 Cobalis’s business failed and YAGI filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California 
against Cobalis on August 1, 2007.  By this point, Cobalis’s share price had declined 
from $0.75 per share at the time that the PIPE transaction closed to about $0.05 per share.  
Although the bankruptcy was ultimately converted into a voluntary Chapter 11 case, 
conflicts abounded between Cobalis, who remained a debtor-in-possession, and YAGI.  
On November 9, 2009, while still in bankruptcy, Cobalis filed an adversary complaint in 
the bankruptcy court against YAGI seeking to void all of the documents associated with 
the PIPE transaction (the “Bankruptcy Adversary Action”).  Cobalis claimed that YAGI 
breached oral and written assurances that it would not short Cobalis shares and that by 
shorting Cobalis shares, YAGI drove down their price and prevented Cobalis from 
raising additional money in the stock market.  It also claimed that YAGI committed 
securities fraud by deceiving Radovich and Chaslav Radovich into entering into the 
transaction.  App. 189.  It sought “rescission of all of the Transaction Documents” that 
comprised the PIPE transaction (defined to include, inter alia, the Pledge and Escrow 
Agreement).  App. 183.    
  The bankruptcy court dismissed Cobalis’s complaint.  Cobalis then amended its 
complaint in the bankruptcy court four times, and each time the bankruptcy judge again 
dismissed it.  In its fifth complaint, Cobalis specifically alleged not only that YAGI 
breached promises to not short Cobalis stock, but that it “wrongfully became beneficial 
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owners of the 8.4 million shares” in escrow.  App. 327.  Part of its final order dismissing 
the fifth complaint with prejudice specifically addressed the Pledge and Escrow 
Agreement, rejecting the notions that YAGI wrongfully became the beneficial owners of 
the 8.4 million shares in escrow, and that YAGI had broken any promises or breached 
any of the transaction documents.  App. 350-51.  Cobalis did not appeal the dismissal. 
 Before the ink on the bankruptcy judge’s final dismissal was dry, Cobalis brought 
an action in the District of New Jersey on August 18, 2011 relating to the same events as 
the Bankruptcy Adversary Action and seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 
that would enjoin YAGI from exercising rights that it had under the transaction 
documents.  The complaint in this first District Court of New Jersey action again 
recounted the history behind the PIPE transaction, defined the relevant transaction 
documents to include the Pledge and Escrow Agreement, and sought “Rescission Of All 
Instruments.”  App. 415.  The district court denied Cobalis’s TRO application, largely 
because Cobalis could not overcome res judicata, and thus could not show a likelihood of 
success on the merits.  It then dismissed the action, and Cobalis again did not appeal. 
 Instead, Radovich and several entities under his control brought the instant action 
on October 25, 2012.  Its allegations mimic those made in the Bankruptcy Adversary 
Action (that were largely repeated in the first New Jersey action).  The complaint 
recounts the history of Cobalis’s PIPE transaction and then alleges that Radovich was 
fraudulently induced into signing the Pledge and Escrow Agreement, that YAGI broke its 
oral assurances that it would not short Cobalis shares, and that YAGI misappropriated the 
8.4 million shares that Radovich put in escrow. 
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 The District Court again dismissed the instant action on res judicata grounds.  It 
held that Radovich was relying on the same underlying events, facts, and theories, as 
Cobalis did in the Bankruptcy Adversary Action.  It further held that the disposition of 
the Bankruptcy Adversary Action bound Radovich (who admittedly was not a party to it) 
because he was in privity with Cobalis.  That Chaslav Radovich was Radovich’s agent in 
negotiating the PIPE transaction, Radovich owned a substantial block of Cobalis shares, 
and Radovich was Cobalis’s chairman created a sufficient identification of interests for 
res judicata purposes.  Radovich timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We 
have jurisdiction over the final decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Our review of the District Court’s application of res judicata is plenary.  
Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).   
III. 
The District Court applied New Jersey claim preclusion law.  Although neither 
party contests this decision, we are not entirely convinced.  “The preclusive effect of 
federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law.”  Semtek Int’l Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-08 (2001).  For federal court judgments in 
suits based on diversity jurisdiction, federal law requires us to look to the rules of 
preclusion of the state where the court that rendered the first judgment sat.  Id. at 508.  
The bankruptcy court used New Jersey substantive law (as required by the transaction 
documents) to resolve the breach of contract-based allegations, making New Jersey 
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preclusion law not an unreasonable choice.  But the bankruptcy court was not exercising 
diversity jurisdiction (it had jurisdiction over the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 
because it was “related to” Cobalis’s bankruptcy) and resolved questions of federal law 
(federal securities fraud) as well.  This implicates the traditional rule that the preclusive 
effect of a federal court’s judgment is determined by federal res judicata principles.  See 
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008).3 
We need not resolve this interesting question in order to resolve this appeal, 
because under either New Jersey or federal preclusion law, our answer will be the same.  
“Both New Jersey and federal law apply res judicata or claim preclusion when three 
circumstances are present: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) 
the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of 
action.”  In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).  
Although the elements of claim preclusion are the same, their precise contours slightly 
vary.  When they do, we will apply the stricter set of preclusion principles.   
It is undisputed that the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the Bankruptcy Adversary 
Action constitutes a final judgment on the merits.  The plaintiffs contend only that they 
                                              
3 Courts are divided on whether to apply federal or state preclusion principles when 
considering the effect of a judgment of a federal bankruptcy court sitting in “related to” 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334.  Compare Higgins v. NMI Enterprises, Inc., No.  09-
6594, 2012 WL 5997951 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2012) (federal preclusion principles apply); 
Boyer v. Gildea, No. 05-CV-129-TS, 2005 WL 2648673 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 17, 2005) 
(federal preclusion principles apply); with In re Cass, 476 B.R. 602, 609 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2012), aff’d, BAP No. CC-12-1513, 2013 WL 1459272 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 
2013) (state preclusion principles apply). 
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were not in privity with Cobalis and that this suit is not based on the same cause of 
action.  We find neither argument persuasive. 
A. 
We turn first to privity.  Under New Jersey law, the concept of privity is 
“necessarily imprecise.”  Zirger v. Gen. Accid. Ins. Co., 676 A.2d 1065, 1071 (N.J. 
1996).  “It is merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one who is a 
party on the record and another is close enough to include that other within the res 
judicata.”  Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 26 A.3d 430, 445 (N.J. 2011) (alteration and 
quotation marks omitted).  A relationship is considered “close enough only when the 
party is a virtual representative of the non-party, or when the non-party actually controls 
the litigation.”  Id. 
  Under federal law, the general rule against non-party preclusion is stricter.  The 
Supreme Court has definitively rejected the “virtual representation” standard that New 
Jersey still recognizes.  See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 904.  Instead, the Supreme Court has 
stated a general rule that non-parties are not bound by prior judgments, and then carved 
out a number of exceptions.  Id. at 892-95.  Because the scope of non-party preclusion 
under federal law is narrower, a non-party precluded under federal law will also be 
precluded under New Jersey law. 
Two of the carefully delineated exceptions that the Supreme Court has recognized 
apply to Radovich.  First, Radovich had several “pre-existing substantive legal 
relationships” with Cobalis.  Id. at 894 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).   At the 
time that Cobalis filed the Bankruptcy Adversary Action, Radovich was the chairman of 
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its board.  Cobalis repeatedly admitted this in successive filings in the bankruptcy court.  
Further, under the Pledge and Escrow Agreement, Radovich and entities under his control 
pledged their shares as security for Cobalis, making Radovich a pledgor and Cobalis a 
beneficiary.  These preexisting substantive legal relationships sufficiently aligned 
Radovich’s interest with Cobalis’s so as to justify binding Radovich by the outcome of 
the Bankruptcy Adversary Action. 
Second, Radovich was “adequately represented” by Cobalis in the prior litigation.  
Id.  “Representative suits with preclusive effect on nonparties include . . . suits brought 
by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.”  Id.  Cobalis undertook the Bankruptcy 
Adversary Action as a debtor-in-possession.  A debtor-in-possession is a fiduciary of its 
creditors and shareholders.  See, e.g., In re Marvel Ent. Grp., Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 471 (3d 
Cir. 1998); see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 
355 (1985).  Filings in Cobalis’s bankruptcy indicate that Radovich, in addition to being 
Cobalis’s chairman and dominant shareholder, was also creditor.  See, e.g., Exhibit B-5 
to Joint Disclosure Statement Describing the Debtor’s Plan and YA Global’s Plan of 
November 9, 2009, ECF No. 268-7 in No. 8:07:1234-TA (the bankruptcy proceeding).  
This relationship is itself sufficient to preclude Radovich from relitigating claims that 
Cobalis asserted in the Bankruptcy Adversary Action.  Cobalis’s goals in the Bankruptcy 
Adversary Action were “squarely aligned,” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V. 
Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 313 (3d Cir. 2009), with Radovich’s:  void the transaction 
documents, including the Pledge and Escrow Agreement, and recover damages. 
B. 
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The District Court also properly held that this suit is based on the same cause of 
action as the Bankruptcy Adversary Action.  “For the purposes of res judicata, causes of 
action are deemed part of a single ‘claim’ if they arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence.”  Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 599 (N.J. 
1991).  Claim preclusion applies not only to matters actually determined in an earlier 
action, but to all relevant matters that could have been so determined.”  McNeil v. 
Legislative Apportionment Comm'n of State, 828 A.2d 840, 859 (N.J. 2003) (quotation 
marks omitted).  We must look at whether the acts complained of, the theory of recovery, 
the necessary witnesses and documents, and the material facts alleged are the same.  First 
Union Nat. Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 921 A.2d 417, 424 (N.J. 2007).4 
We have little difficulty concluding that this action arises out of the same 
transaction or occurrence as the Bankruptcy Adversary Action.  This case arises out of 
events surrounding the exact same PIPE transaction.  Radovich’s claims are substantially 
the same as those asserted in the Bankruptcy Adversary Action:  that the defendants 
breached representations they made to Radovich and Cobalis that fraudulently induced 
them into signing the transaction documents, then maliciously sold Cobalis shares to 
drive down their price and wrongfully became beneficial owners of 8.4 million shares 
that Radovich had pledged as collateral.  This action seeks rescission of the Pledge and 
Escrow Agreement, one of the very same transaction documents that Cobalis sought 
rescission of in the Bankruptcy Adversary Action.  Indeed, many of the paragraphs in the 
                                              
4 The contours of federal common law are not different in any material respect.  See 
Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 726 F.3d 387, 394-95 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (describing the federal standard). 
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instant complaint have been lifted verbatim from the complaints in the Bankruptcy 
Adversary Action. 
IV. 
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
the plaintiffs’ complaint.  
